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Ecocide Is Genocide: Decolonizing the Definition of Genocide
Lauren J. Eichler

Old Dominion University
Norfolk, Virginia, USA
Introduction
In 1492, European explorers arrived in the Americas, bringing devastating changes to the
land, ecosystems, and lives of the Indigenous peoples. Some of these changes were wrought
unintentionally, such as the diseases, rats, and invasive plant species that came with the settlers.
Other changes, like the clear-cutting of forests to make way for farms and homesteads, the hunting
of game animals to near extinction, and the removing of Indigenous peoples from their traditional
lands, were more deliberate. For the Indigenous peoples, these changes had long term ramifications
for the vitality of their cultures, the effects of which are still being experienced today. According to
the worldviews of many Native American cultures, the destruction brought upon the land, water,
and nonhuman beings of the Americas was an act of violence against their communities. I argue
that this violence should be considered an act of genocide and that the study of genocide and our
current responses to it are still largely colonial and anthropocentric.
In this article, I demonstrate how the destruction of nonhuman animals, land, water, and
other nonhuman beings constitute forms of genocide according to Indigenous metaphysics.1 In
environmental studies and genocide studies, the destruction of nonhuman beings and nature is
typically treated as a separate, but related phenomenon—ecocide, the destruction of nonhuman
nature. In this article, I follow in the footsteps of Native American and First Nations scholars like
Donald Grinde, Winona LaDuke, Tasha Hubbard, and Laurelyn Whitt to argue from an Indigenous
perspective on nonhuman personhood that ecocide and the genocide of Indigenous peoples are
inextricably linked and are even constitutive of the same act. Recognizing that ecocide is a form
of genocide challenges the anthropocentricism implicit in the current definition of genocide and
expands the concept of genocide without significantly altering its official legal definition. I argue
that if justice is to be achieved for Indigenous peoples through the United Nations’ ability to
prosecute genocide, then the definition of genocide needs to—at minimum—include ecocide as a
recognized act.
Cultural Genocide, Social Death, and Ecocide
One of the primary shortcomings of the human rights approach to responding to genocidal
violence is that the focus of humanitarian efforts becomes based almost entirely on the wellbeing
of individual humans rather than with concern for the natural world that sustains them. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) does not mention the environment, the natural
world, or creatures other than humans, even though human life depends on nonhuman nature
for sustenance and cultural development. Both the definition of genocide—which accounts only
for human groups—and the UDHR exhibit such shortcomings, writing nonhuman animals and
other beings out of the ethical and political equation when it comes to atrocities. Yet, such a limited
definition of genocide and human wellbeing has not been the only way of interpreting genocide
and genocidal violence. Raphaël Lemkin defined genocide in a significantly different way than
1

Two points of note—first, in this article, I will focus primarily on the troubles faced by and the philosophies of
Indigenous communities located in North America. However, the philosophies of other Indigenous groups, including
the Maori and those located in South America and India, overlap in significant ways and could also be applied to the
argument I make. Second, I use various terms to refer to the Indigenous peoples of North America including Native
Americans, Indigenous peoples, Natives, First Nations, and American Indians. When possible, I try to use specific
tribal/national affiliations, but when I am discussing philosophical positions and experiences held by many tribes in
common, I use umbrella terms like those listed above. First Nations refers specifically to Indigenous communities
within the borders of Canada while American Indians refer to Indigenous peoples living within the borders of the
contiguous US and Alaska. I typically use the term Native Americans when I am referring broadly to Indigenous
peoples who live within Canada and the US. Indigenous peoples is likewise used in a similar way to indicate Native
peoples and communities within the US generally speaking and at times to be inclusive of Indigenous peoples
elsewhere in the world. Though the term “indigenous” is a contested concept, for the purposes of this article and my
focus on the North American context, by “Indigenous peoples” I mean communities and peoples who were residing
in North America prior to the continent’s colonization by Europeans.
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the definition eventually adopted by the UN. According to Lemkin, genocide does not necessarily
entail the physical destruction of a national or ethnic group. Rather, genocide signifies,
a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of
the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objects
of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture,
language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and
the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the
individuals belonging to such groups.2

Whereas the UN definition mainly restricts genocide to acts carried out against the bodies and
individuals of the targeted human group, Lemkin’s definition accounts for a much broader
understanding of what constitutes group destruction.3 In addition to mass murder, preventing
births, and physical destruction, Lemkin also includes the dissolution of political parties,
colonization, abolition of local law, censorship, restrictions on language, withholding food and
medicine, moral debasement, and crippling economic development. Unlike the acts listed in the
UN definition, which predominantly describe harms that directly affect the physical body of the
group members, these acts are indirect harms that compromise quality of life and the ability of a
group to carry on as a group. The acts that Lemkin lists destroy a group not by taking lives per se but
by forcefully supplanting one group’s way of being in the world—the principles, institutions, and
values that make that group distinct from other human groups—with the principles, institutions,
and values held by another group.
This broader conception aligns with more recent conversations about genocide. Claudia Card,
for example, argues that what distinguishes genocide from other crimes against humanity is its
role in bringing about social death.4 According to Card, a social group is not just a collection of
individuals but a set of relationships.5 These relationships contribute to the social vitality of a group
and are constituted by social, institutional, political, and moral practices.6 Social death involves the
breakdown or eradication of these relationships so that what made life as a group meaningful no
longer exists. Social vitality not only applies to living members of the group, but also connects
members of the group through history and time.7 It is intergenerational. Genocide, both physical
and cultural, inhibits the flourishing, growth, and organic development of these relationships.
Though social death can be understood within the terms of the UN definition, Lemkin’s definition,
which directs attention to the destruction of cultural relationships, makes this particular harm
more evident.
Recently, genocide scholars have demonstrated renewed interest in Lemkin’s writings.
Frustrated by the limitations of the UN definition, researchers like Dirk Moses, Damien Short, and
Jürgen Zimmerer see Lemkin’s research as one way of conceptualizing problems related to genocide
that have been under-theorized or overlooked, especially regarding colonization.8 These authors
note that the UN’s narrow definition does a great disservice to colonized Indigenous peoples who
3

United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide,
December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/260(III)), accessed July 16, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/
documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20
Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf

4

Claudia Card, “Genocide and Social Death,” in Genocide’s Aftermath: Responsibility and Repair, ed. Claudia Card and
Armen T. Marsoobian (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 10-26.

5

Ibid., 10-11.

6

Ibid., 16.

7

Ibid., 20.

8

Dirk A. Moses, “Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History,” in Empire, Colony, Genocide:
Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008),
3-54; Damien Short, Redefining Genocide: Settler Colonialism, Social Death, and Ecocide (London: Zed Books, 2016); Jürgen
Zimmerer, “Colonialism and the Holocaust: Towards an Archeology of Genocide,” in Genocide and Settler Society:
Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books
2004), 49-76.
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were not always killed in the process of colonization but whose group life was forcibly altered
and destroyed through the efforts of colonizers. Even acts that were considered “humanitarian”
or “humanizing” such as residential schools, reservations, and other efforts at assimilating Native
peoples into the new dominant culture often brought about social and cultural death by depriving
people of maintaining traditions, language, and relationships not only with one another but also
with the land and other elements of nonhuman nature around them.
Though there is growing interest in the link between colonization and genocide, the majority of
genocide literature, which debates definitions and legal action, perpetuate (often unintentionally)
the erasure of the plight of Indigenous peoples as an act of genocide. The experiences of colonized
Indigenous peoples are treated as categorically different from genocide. For example, in Native
America and the Question of Genocide, Alex Alvarez argues that the term genocide is overused
when discussing the harms experienced by the Indigenous peoples of North America. Many of
these assertions of genocide, he says, “seem to be based more on a general sense of outrage and
horror than on any clear and rigorous understanding about what is or is not genocide.”9 Though
he approaches the claims of genocide in North America with some skepticism, Alvarez does not
say genocide did not occur. Rather, “care needs to be taken when applying this label to specific
historical events.”10 Following a review of various episodes of violence perpetrated against Native
Americans, Alvarez concludes that the Trail of Tears, though horrific, was not genocide, while
the residential school system was a form of cultural genocide,11 and the massacres of Californian
Indians were definitely genocide. Native American scholar Joseph P. Gone of the Gros Ventre
Nation makes a similar argument in his article “Colonial Genocide and Historical Trauma in North
America,” but he goes a step further than Alvarez in restricting the definition of genocide. Gone
argues that for the sake of conceptual clarity, genocide should refer only to instances of violence
that involve mass murder. He argues that there are already a variety of terms to describe various
acts of violence including ethnic cleansing, colonization, massacres, and human rights violations:
“Thus, what seems to be distinctive about the term genocide is its reference to the ‘crime of all
crimes,’ namely, group-based mass murder.”12 Given this definition, Gone holds that much of the
violence that occurred against Native Americans through colonization is not genocide even though
intermittent genocides did occur as colonization proceeded. He specifically calls into question
the value of lumping Indian killers, buffalo hunters, and residential school teachers together as
perpetrators of genocide.13 In other words, Gone claims that genocide was not “at all typical or
representative, of the European project of colonization, or that colonization can be casually equated
with genocide.”14 For both authors, the goal of making these distinctions is to ensure that the power
of the word genocide does not become diluted.
Alvarez and Gone’s reasons for so narrowly defining genocide might be beneficial for bringing
about conceptual clarity and might reflect a consideration for the legal standing of the definition, but
mass killing hardly exhausts the methods that can be used to destroy a group. Lemkin’s definition,
which accounts for the destruction of language, religion, and other cultural institutions, provides
a more nuanced account of what happened and is still happening to Indigenous peoples in North
America and around the world. Though Lemkin did not specifically talk about the destruction of
nature, the environment, or ecosystems in his definition of genocide, his definition leaves room
for the inclusion of this issue. This is particularly relevant for Indigenous peoples whose physical
and cultural destruction coincided with their removal from their land, the decimation of various
9

Alex Alvarez, Native America and the Question of Genocide (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 3.

10

Ibid., 4.

11

Notice here that Alvarez uses the term “cultural” to modify “genocide,” implying that residential schools are not
examples of outright genocide, a term which he reserves for incidents that typically involve mass murder. For more
on his usage of the term “cultural genocide,” see Alvarez Native America and the Question of Genocide, 156-157.

12

Joseph P. Gone, “Colonial Genocide and Historical Trauma in Native North America: Complicating Contemporary
Attributions,” in Colonial Genocide in Indigenous North America, ed. Andrew Woolford et al. (Durham: Duke University
Press, 2014), 279.

13

Ibid., 285.

14

Ibid., 284.
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nonhuman animal species including beaver and bison, and alterations to the landscape including
the damming of rivers, deforestation, and the introduction of new pollutants. Because many
Indigenous cultures lived in close proximity to the other-than-human world around them and
often viewed nonhuman beings as community members, the destruction of these relationships
would have constituted a type of social death.
The majority of genocide literature does not seriously or thoroughly analyze the connection
between genocide and the destruction of nonhuman nature, otherwise known as ecocide. In this
respect, most genocide and human rights scholarship remains anthropocentric, such that only the
destruction of and the dignity of human life is considered to be of consequence. The term “ecocide”
was coined in 1970 by a group of scientists to describe the devastation being wrought to the land in
Vietnam as a result of chemical weapons like Agent Orange. Lawyer and activist Polly Higgins later
defined ecocide as “extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory,
whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the
inhabitants of that territory has been severely diminished.”15 Because “ecocide” is still a relatively
under-theorized subject, the term covers a wide array of acts and harms. Higgins’ definition of
ecocide does not stipulate intent like the UN definition of genocide does. This means that humans
may commit ecocide unintentionally or as a means to a different end as in the case of businesses
that do not intentionally set out to destroy land, forests, or water, but do so negligently or in pursuit
of some other goal. Higgins distinguishes between two forms of ecocide: non-ascertainable and
ascertainable. The former has no discernible human cause, while the latter does.16 For example one
type of non-ascertainable ecocide is extreme weather events related to climate change. These are not
directly due to human intent; rather, they are the byproduct of human activities in the world. For
the most part, however, the term is commonly used to describe perceivable harms done by humans
to nonhuman beings and the planet with the effect of inhibiting the flourishing of human life. As
Arthur W. Galston argued in his proposal for an international agreement on banning ecocide, “[i]t
seems to me that willful and permanent destruction of environment in which a people can live
in a manner of their own choosing ought similarly to be considered a crime against humanity,
to be designated by the term ecocide.”17 Thus, examples of ecocide are quite varied, including
everything from the mass death of bees due to the overuse of pesticides to the clear-cutting of the
Amazon Rainforest for the purposes of creating more farmland to climate change to the poaching
of rare species to be sold on the black market as medicine, pets, or delicacies.
Though the concept of ecocide has gained traction among environmentalists and advocates
for Indigenous rights, ecocide is not considered a crime on the international stage. Only ten
countries have adopted laws criminalizing ecocide.18 Even though the inclusion of ecocide as an
international crime has been debated at the UN various times between 1973 and 2010, culminating
with a proposal to amend the Rome Statute of the Criminal Court to include ecocide as the fifth
Crime against Peace, each effort to incorporate it failed.19 However, as the threats of anthropogenic
climate change become increasingly real, there has been a resurgence of interest in the connection
between ecocide and genocide. As Higgens points out, “ecocide leads to resource depletion, and
where there is escalation of resource depletion, war comes chasing close behind.”20 And often with
war comes a surge of crimes against humanity like genocide.
In Ecocide of Native America, Donald Grinde of the Yamasee tribe and Bruce E. Johansen link
ecocide with the genocide of Native Americans and other indigenous peoples. By examining
the testimonies of Native People impacted by a variety of environmental disasters that followed
15

Polly Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide: Laws and Governance to Prevent the Destruction of Our Planet (London: ShepheardWalwyn LTD, 2010), 63.

16

Ibid.

17

Quoted in Short, Redefining Genocide, 40.

18

These include the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of
Armenia, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Ukraine, and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam.

19

Higgins, Eradicating Ecocide, 68-70.

20

Ibid., 62.
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colonization including uranium mining, depletion of fisheries, and destruction of plains for
ranching, the authors demonstrate how these practices have interfered with traditional indigenous
methods of engaging with the nonhuman world and the devastating impact this has had on the
future of those communities in physical, spiritual, and cultural ways. According to the testimony
of Jewell Praying Wolf James of the Lummi Tribe, the destruction of land, water, and nonhuman
life has been central to this experience of genocide.
At one time our plains, plateaus, and ancient forests were respected and not considered a
wilderness. The skies were darkened with migrating fowl. The plains were blanketed with
massive herds of buffalo. Our mountains teemed with elk, deer, bear, beaver, and other furbearing animals. All the rivers were full of salmon and fish—so much that you could walk
across their backs to get to the other side. The plants and trees were medicines or food for us.
We knew neither hunger nor disease until contact came in 1492, then our holocaust began
and that of the plants, animals, and environment.21

Though Grinde and Johansen link ecocide and genocide, their focus is primarily on ecocide and
less on how this connects to the problem of genocide more generally. In Redefining Genocide,
sociologist Damien Short provides some of this theoretical groundwork by taking a closer look at
what he deems the “genocide-ecocide nexus.” Drawing on Lemkin’s definition of genocide that
characterizes genocide as the destruction of a group’s culture as well as physical life, Short argues
that ecocide has been used in the modern era to destroy Indigenous group life. For Short, ecocide
is a method of genocide if “such destruction results in conditions of life that fundamentally threaten
a social group’s cultural and/or physical existence.”22 According to Short, humans are “ecologically
embedded beings.”23 As such, wrecking the ecosystems in which humans persist would ultimately
lead to the destruction of human lives and cultures. Through various case studies he shows how
settler colonists put profits and resource extraction ahead of the lives and livelihoods of Indigenous
groups who shared and continue to share the territory. Exploitation of land and resources for
political and economic gain on the part of the state and businesses becomes a justification for ethnic
cleansing, extermination, and forced removal of Indigenous groups.
For example, in one case study Short looks at the effects of Canada’s Athabasca tar sands
project on nearby First Nations communities. Short reports that in the name of energy security,
the US and Canada have pursued opportunities to extract oil and other resources using risky and
especially environmentally destructive technologies. The tar sands project in Alberta, Canada
involves extracting bitumen, a viscous and dense form of petroleum, through techniques such as
strip mining and fracking. The tar sands site, which is as large as the state of Florida, consists of
mined pits, pools of oil, and rivers of water that have been redirected from all available nearby
sources. The land has been stripped of wildlife, trees, and topsoil. Runoff from the mining
procedures contaminates rivers on the level of major oil spills on a regular basis. These lands, which
had traditionally belonged to the Cree, Metís, and Dené peoples, are now entirely uninhabitable.24
Though members of these First Nations still live in Alberta not far from the site of the tar sands
project, the contamination of the land and water has been so bad that they fear drinking the water,
hunting game, and planting on the land. Cancer rates have soared in their communities.25 The
Canadian government has repeatedly denied that the tar sands project is the cause of these issues,
insisting that the project provides jobs for members of Indigenous communities, even though prior
to beginning extraction, the Indigenous peoples were able to survive and carry on their traditional
cultural practices through their relationship with the land and subsistence hunting.
Short demonstrates that the oil-extraction process is genocidal insofar as it damages the
21

Donald A. Grinde and Bruce E. Johansen, Ecocide of Native America: Environmental Destruction of Indian Lands and Peoples
(Santa Fe: Clear Light Publishers, 1995), 250.

22

Short, Redefining Genocide, 6.

23

Ibid., 9.

24

Ibid., 169-171.

25

Ibid., 174.
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physical health and wellbeing of the Indigenous peoples who live near this site while inhibiting
their ability to carry on their traditional cultural practices by inducing fear and taking over more
and more of the land on which they lived. Indigenous scholars like Michelle Jacob of the Yakama
Nation agree, noting:
from an Indigenous perspective, the Tar Sands extraction project represents an assault on the
earth; the fracking, drilling, extraction, and massive construction of pipelines across Turtle
Island, from Alberta to the Gulf Coast, is creating a wasteland. Tribal treaty rights and tribal
people’s ability to protect their homeland become casualties of war in the settler colonial
quest to extract resources for profit in the energy wars.26

Environmental devastation of this sort functions like a slow genocide, eroding the health of the
people, their sovereignty as a nation, and the land, all of which are integral to their group identity.
Because this form of genocide might occur over such a long period of time, it may not always
be immediately recognizable as genocide, especially when compared to other genocides like the
Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, or the Bosnian genocide.
In this case study, Short treats ascertainable ecocide as a method of genocide but not equivalent
to genocide. In other words, like murder, ecocide may be used as a tool to commit genocide or it
might not depend on whether it is aimed at (directly or indirectly) destroying a human group. For
Short, environmental devastation is one way of destroying human groups that could potentially
fall under two criteria for the UN definition of genocide: causing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of the group and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction. Through case studies, Short convincingly demonstrates that
ecocide carried out by dominant colonial cultures disproportionately affected and continues to
affect Indigenous peoples in a genocidal way. His analysis, one of the few in genocide scholarship
that makes an explicit connection between the effects of ecocide and its role in genocide, provides
new avenues for thinking about the causes of genocide and how they might be prevented.
However, I argue that ecocide is more than just a method. It is genocide. Furthermore, I
claim that ascertainable ecocide is always genocide, even if there are no human groups directly
or indirectly targeted for destruction. As I will show, Short’s analysis, like the UN definition
of genocide, is anthropocentric, relying on human-animal and human-nature binaries. This
assumption is especially problematic when thinking about the effects of ecocide on Indigenous
peoples and the nonhuman members of their communities. Though Short takes an important
step toward applying a new decolonizing lens to the study of genocide, I argue that we need to
go further by recognizing that metaphysical assumptions that exist for Westerners like human
exceptionalism do not necessarily hold for Indigenous peoples. Ecocide is not just a method, which
suggests that destroying the natural world is a tool for destroying a group of human people; rather,
ecocide is an act of genocide because it literally eliminates, disfigures, and maims the other-thanhuman members of Indigenous communities. Furthermore, by treating ecocide as a method rather
than genocide itself, the anthropocentric bias within genocide studies is reinforced and repeated.
For both of these reasons, I draw on Native American philosophies of nonhuman personhood to
argue in the next sections that ecocide and genocide should be thought of as the same thing and
creating a space for ecocide within the legal definition of genocide is one way to render the legal
definition of genocide more just.
Nonhuman Personhood and the Genocide-Ecocide Nexus
Though Short connects ecocide to the practice of genocide, there are two aspects of his analysis
that need further development. First, Short deems ecocide problematic because of its devastating
effect on human life but not necessarily because of the harm it wreaks on nonhuman beings and
the planet. In this respect, Short relies on and maintains a human-nature dualism that understands
ecocide to be more morally problematic because of its effects on humans than its effects on other
26

Michelle M. Jacob, Indian Pilgrims: Indigenous Journeys of Activism and Healing with Saint Kateri Tekakwitha (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 2016), 64.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 2 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.2.1720

Eichler

110

beings.27 For example, in his discussion of fracking, Short states,
indeed, in numerous studies from both countries [the US and Australia], local communities
most affected by developments often cite considerable negative impacts on the environment
and human health, including groundwater contamination, air pollution, radioactive and
toxic waste, water usage, earthquakes, methane migration, and the industrialization of rural
landscapes, the cumulative effect of which has led to calls for the United Nations Human
Rights Council (HRC) to condemn fracking as a threat to basic human rights, particularly the
rights to water and health. Fracking development is fast becoming a human rights issue.28

Here Short frames ecocide as a human rights problem—ecocide is bad because it infringes upon
human freedom. He does not examine the implications of fracking and other types of resource
exploitation practices on the lives of nonhuman beings, even though all of these acts are done at
their expense. Implicit in this reading of ecocide and genocide is the notion that nature is passive,
waiting to be exploited or preserved at the whims of whatever various groups of humans seem to
value it at the time. In this outlook, the land, water, air, plants, and nonhuman animals exist for the
sake of human use, and their depletion, overuse, and extinction might be tragic on its own but is
only immoral insofar as it puts human life in jeopardy. This approach to ecocide leads to the second
problem, which pertains to how Short presents the impact of ecocide on Indigenous peoples.
Short’s analysis of the impact of ecocide on Indigenous peoples follows from the logic that
nature is a passive recipient of human action. For example, in his assessment of the impact of the tar
sands extraction, he writes, “[t]he effects on downstream indigenous groups are truly staggering.
Their ability to hunt, trap and fish has been severely curtailed and, where it is possible, people are
often too fearful of toxins to drink water and eat fish from waterways polluted by the ‘externalities’
of tar sand production.”29 Elsewhere he writes,
Indigenous peoples living close to and in the midst of tar and sand deposits have been
expressing concern over the lethal impacts that these industrial events have had on their
communities for years, with elders citing caustic changes to water quality, meat quality, and
to the availability of fish and game. Concern is growing recently as health professionals and
community members witness more and more friends and family fall ill with a variety of
serious illnesses, and local fish populations are inflicted with ever more severe deformities.30

In both quotations, Short notes that tar sands extraction has a detrimental effect on nonhuman
creatures, but the language he uses indicates that he is thinking about this harm in terms of its
consequences for humans. The extraction process is not mentioned in terms of its harm to deer, elk,
and other wildlife but only insofar as it affects the freedom of humans to hunt game and acquire
meat. His mention of fish is connected to the human fear of eating them. The changes to water
quality, the explosion of illnesses, and the increasing precariousness of life are understood only in
terms of human suffering.
To be clear, these issues pose serious problems to the health and wellbeing of the individual
members of Indigenous communities and the continuation of their cultures. The continuation of
their cultures relies on their ability to live according to traditional practices that are rooted in their
connection with particular areas of land and the beings that live there. Short demonstrates that

27

I regard binary and dualism as two different things. A binary or dichotomy designates a difference between two kinds
often in such a way that suggests that those two kinds are the only options. Dualism is a binary relationship that is
framed by differential power relations. For example, the male-female dualism indicates not only sexual difference
between two kinds but also the superiority of one kind over the other—in this case, the male over the female. The
human-animal dualism functions similarly in that it suggests that there are either humans or animals and that
humans rank higher ontologically, morally, etc. than animals or plants within a given metaphysical framework.

28

Short, Redefining Genocide, 59.

29

Ibid., 11.

30

Ibid., 174.
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he recognizes the importance of this connection, but even though he describes this connection in
anthropocentric terms. He states,
[a]s Native author and activist Andrea Smith noted (Smith 2005: 121), ‘when Native peoples
fight for cultural/spiritual preservation, they are ultimately fighting for the landbase
which grounds their spirituality and culture’. That is, the land or ‘specific geographical
setting’ (Churchill 2005: 168) with which many indigenous nations/communities identify
themselves fundamentally embodies their ‘historical narrative’ (Abed 2006: 362) and who
they are as peoples; with both their ‘practices, rituals, and traditions’ (ibid.: 327), and their
political and socio-economic cohesion as a group, inextricably bound to the surrounding
landscape. Alienation from that landscape, therefore inevitably results in the dissolution of
an indigenous people’s ‘network of practical social relations’ (Powell 2007: 538), for they will
no longer be able to carry out, develop and preserve their ‘cultural heritage and traditions,’
or ‘pass these traditions on to subsequent generations - thereby rendering them ‘socially
dead.’31

In this passage, Short continues to think in terms of a human-nature dualism. According to Short,
Indigenous peoples have strong connections to the land on which they live; the land is a site at
which “practical social relations” take place, but the land itself is not recognized as a participating
member in these relations. In fact, for Short, it is not so much that Indigenous peoples become
alienated from land, but from the “landscape,” which is defined as a particular place or territory in
which (presumably human) activity happens.32 But this is not the predominant way in which many
Native peoples—especially Native Americans, First Nations, and Maori, among others—identify
with land. In fact, if we take into account the metaphysical principles that ground the worldview
and practices of many of these cultures, we can see that ecocide is a far more direct and egregious
crime for these communities than Short seems to acknowledge. To demonstrate this, I draw on
two interrelated metaphysical principles that appear in many Indigenous philosophies.33 The first
principle, which is expressed through the Lakota phrase mitakuye oyasin (all my relations) holds
that everything is related.34 The second principle expresses that the universe is alive and must be
approached in a personal manner.35
According to Muscogee scholar Daniel Wildcat, “[s]tated simply, indigenous means ‘to be of a
place.’”36 However, this does not just refer to the fact that individuals are born in particular places.
To be of a place is an active concept that denotes an ongoing relationship that shapes and reshapes
the identity of the place and the individuals that inhabit it. Place is not an abstract concept that can
simply be pointed to on a map. Place is connected to the land itself, and the land is the ground on
which all relationships take place; it is the foundation for relationality, and it is also the foundation
for identity. For example, according to the Choctaw and Chickasaw creation stories, the peoples
of those nations were created from mud and emerged from the ground, the earth literally giving
birth to them. Furthermore, Choctaw and Chickasaw oral traditions point to particular locations
31
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where this happened, including the mounds in Mississippi and Alabama.37 In these stories the land
is neither passive nor generic. The land is particular, and it actively participates in the creation of
the people, and the people share its substance, making them relatives.
As the land itself is an active participant in relationships, it possesses its own power, energy,
and purpose. As Lakota scholar Vine Deloria, Jr. elaborates, in an Indigenous worldview “power
and place are dominant concepts—power being the living energy that inhabits and/or composes
the universe, and place being the relationship of things to each other.”38 The relationships and
identities that spring from the land are not abstract concepts, but are particular and lived. For
example, Brian Burkhart, a member of the Cherokee Nation, explains that the phrase “we are all
related” is not an abstract, universal platitude about interconnectedness.39 It refers to relationships
with particular beings. Referencing the film Lakota Wisdom Keepers, Burkhart calls attention to the
way that Lakota wisdom-keeper David Swallow, Jr. points to specific trees and the earth right
at his feet to explain the concept.40 In contrast to Short’s description of the relationship between
Native peoples and the land, the land is an active, lively participant in the making and sustaining
of relationships. As Choctaw scholar Laurelyn Whitt explains, “[t]he land and living entities
which make it up are not apart from, but a part of, the people. Nor is ‘the environment’ something
outside of, or surrounding, a people. The relation of belonging is ontologically basic. With inherent
possession, agency is sometimes held to be reciprocal—a people belongs to/owns the land, and the
land belongs to/owns a people.”41 In other words, in this cosmology the land is a person, not a thing
or a resource to be consumed.42 Haudenosaunee/Anishinaabe scholar Vanessa Watts reinforces this
notion of the land as person when she states that the land not only is in relation to Indigenous
peoples but also is literally family: “[o]ur truth, not only Anishnaabe and Haudenosaunee people
but in a majority of Indigenous societies, conceives that we (humans) are made from the land; our
flesh is literally an extension of the soil.”43
Though Short recognizes that land is not generic and that removing Indigenous peoples from
their lands is harmful because they have specific ties to those particular lands, insofar as he is still
working from a Western notion of personhood, he misses an important point: “power and place
produce personality.”44 According to Deloria, this means that “the universe is alive, but it also
contains within it the very important suggestion that the universe is personal and, therefore, must
be approached in a personal manner.”45 For Indigenous peoples, the problem of dispossession is
not just a matter of having land—it is a matter of staying connected to the particular land with
which they have relationships and knowledge. As Tewa philosopher Gregory Cajete explains, the
relationship between the people and land is so deep and intense that forced removal constitutes a
kind of “soul death” for entire generations, resulting in profound homesickness and psychological
trauma.46 If the land is a living being that possesses power, particularity, personality, and agency,
then the land is more than just a landscape—it is a member of the community. And as such, actions
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like strip mining, tar sands extraction, fracking, deforestation, and other activities that disfigure the
land are more than just ecocidal—they are genocidal. Destruction of the land is not just a means
of destroying human group life; to destroy the land is to harm a living member of the community.
A similar argument can be made in regard to other-than-human animals, plants, and other
beings that share the land that Indigenous peoples inhabit. According to Shawnee philosopher
Thomas Norton-Smith, Native Americans have an expansive notion of personhood, which reflect
the insights that “(1) personhood does not constitute the essence of a human being; (2) an entity is a
person by virtue of its membership and participation in a network of social and moral relationships
and practices with other persons; and (3) moral agency is at the core of personhood.”47 This view
of personhood contrasts sharply with many theories of personhood in the Western worldview,
which almost exclusively attribute personhood to humans due to various characteristics that are
supposedly unique to human life—primarily rationality, agency, moral reasoning, and free will.48
Because the Western notion of personhood relies on human uniqueness, it frequently assumes
a hierarchy between humans, animals, and other beings. However, this hierarchy does not exist
for many Native American communities. Chickasaw writer Linda Hogan, explains, “[f]or us, the
animals are understood to be our equals. They are still our teachers. They are our helpers and
healers. They have been our guardians and we have been theirs.”49
Being members of different species is not a barrier to these relationships because underlying
this approach to nonhuman personhood is the ontological principle that everything is related. As
Deloria explains, “[e]verything in the natural world has relationships with every other thing and
the total set of relationships makes up the natural world as we experience it.”50 Put differently, no
human or nonhuman being exists independently; all things are connected to one another in lively,
complex relationships. In contrast to the view that nonhuman nature is dead, inert, or passive,
from Native American worldviews, nonhuman animals like deer, bears, and salmon, along with
bodies of water, features of the land like canyons or buttes, and sacred objects like drums and pipes
can all possess a kind of power, force or spirit. Algonkin tribes call it manitou, but other tribes use
the terms nilchi’i (Dine), usen (Apache), wakan (Lakota), and orenda (Wendat).51 This quality imbues
beings with their own animacy, power, and purposiveness, which calls for recognition and respect.
The recognition that other beings possess manitou cannot be reduced to religious belief; it is a fact
of the world. According to Norton-Smith, spiritual forces like manitou are experientially akin to
the Western concept of the mind. In other words, even though one does not have direct access to
the thoughts and mental states of others, one can infer from experience that other humans have
minds. Likewise, outward signs indicate that other-than-human beings possess manitou.52 Because
all beings are capable of sharing these attributes and are in relation to one another, there is no
passive or isolated being-in-the-world. Everything has the potential to be a person through its
relationships and through the obligations it owes and receives.
This notion of personhood has real effects in the world, guiding the form that relationships
between humans and other animals take. According to Native American philosophies, humans and
other animals are kin. Black Elk of the Oglala Lakota, for example, describes how his life story is
“of all life that is holy and is good to tell, and of us two-leggeds sharing in it with the four-leggeds
and the wings of the air and all green things; for these are children of one mother and their father
is one spirit.”53 In other words, other-than-human animals and plants are siblings to humans. In
many Western societies it is accepted that humans have moral obligations first and foremost to
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their immediate human kin and family. By understanding relationships with nonhuman persons
as familial, Indigenous peoples more easily fold those beings into their realm of moral obligation.
What binds people together is not species membership but a shared experience, knowledge, and
participation in life that is rooted in a particular place.54
These relationships also take more political forms. For instance, First Nations and Native
American scholars like Nuu-cha-nuulth philosopher Eugene Richard Atleo, Anishinaabe writer
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, and Cajete say that for many tribes nonhuman animals and
humans are in treaty relationships: “[a]ccording to Nishnaabeg traditions, our relationship with
the moose nation, the deer nation and the caribou nation is a treaty relationship like any other,
and all the parties involved have both rights and responsibilities in terms of maintaining the
agreement.”55 All three authors describe particular protocols56 that must be followed when dealing
with nonhuman animal nations that demonstrate the proper amount of respect for those beings
whose activities and lives sustain Native communities.57 For example, Simpson considers a story
about the sudden disappearance of the caribou. After searching high and low for any trace of the
missing caribou, one seeker sent out from the Nishnaabeg met a young doe who told the seeker
that the caribou had left after being disrespected by the Nishnaabeg people. The caribou felt that
the people did not appreciate their gifts as evinced by practices of overhunting, wasting meat, and
not showing proper reverence. The tribe sent diplomats, spiritual leaders, and mediators to listen
to and negotiate with the caribou, and eventually the two parties came to a mutually satisfactory
agreement about how the Nishnaabeg should interact with the caribou, resulting in a political
treaty.58 This story demonstrates that from an Indigenous perspective, other-than-human animal
beings are seen as equal to humans. They have their own communities, interests, and politics, and
they are recognized as constituting nations themselves.
Accepting either claim about human-nonhuman relationships—that other-than-human
animals are kin to humans or that other-than-human animals are political beings that have their
own nations—leads to a radical rethinking of who and what is affected by ecocide and genocide.
The UN definition of genocide states that genocide involves killing a group in whole or in part. If
we accept that nonhuman beings like land, salmon, and maize can be kin to humans, then killing
other-than-human persons is a direct attack on a given community or group, and their destruction
constitutes destroying part of that “human” group. Likewise, if we accept that a political relationship
exists between humans and other-than-human persons, this also amounts to genocide. One of the
groups named in the UN definition of genocide is the national group. If groups of nonhuman
animals consist of separate nations, their destruction is genocide.59 While that genocide may lead
to the genocide of the humans who are in relation to nonhuman nations, it can also be recognized
independently from the genocide experienced by humans. To illustrate this, consider the mass
slaughter of buffalo that was carried out during westward expansion in the US.
In her article “Buffalo Genocide in the Nineteenth Century”, Tasha Hubbard of the Cree,
Nakota, Anishinaabe, and Metís makes this point exquisitely. She argues that the destruction of the
buffalo was genocidal not simply because it led to the physical and social deaths of human persons,
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but because “specific genocidal practices and their theoretical underpinnings can be applied to
the buffalo slaughter.”60 Citing historical documents, she shows how settlers intentionally set
about slaughtering buffalo with the goal of exterminating them, killing vast numbers of them and
kidnapping calves, which resulted in the social death of the buffalo and the decline of their mental
and emotional health.61 Though Hubbard’s argument is quite compelling, reviewing the case of the
buffalo is worthwhile in order to demonstrate what is at stake.
Buffalo Genocide
Before 1800, 30 million to 60 million buffalo lived on the plains from Northern Saskatchewan to New
Mexico and as far east as the Appalachian Mountains.62 Their presence shaped the environment,
making them a keystone species.63 For the plains tribes, the buffalo were a crucial component of
their cultures and social fabric. Not only did the buffalo create a particular habitat suited to a
diverse ecosystem in which Indigenous peoples could survive, their bodies provided a source of
food, clothing, shelter, and tools. Additionally, the buffalo were central to the spiritual identity
of the community. According to Black Elk, “[i]t was the White Buffalo Cow Woman who in the
beginning brought to us our most sacred pipe, and from that time, we have been related with the
Four-Leggeds and all that moves. Tatanka, the buffalo, is the closest four-legged relative that we
have, and they live as a people, as we do.”64
By the mid-1800s, the buffalo populations were starting to decline.65 White settlers, who were
bringing their cattle onto the land, displaced the buffalo. Tribes from the east, forced to vacate their
traditional homelands, were removed onto plains land, leading to greater demand for the buffalo
as a resource.66 This process was accompanied by sudden growth in the buffalo hide robe market.
In 1835, the American Fur Co. alone had an order for 36,000 buffalo robes, and by 1857, the number
of hides delivered to retailers was up to 70,400 hides per year.67 Between 1872 and 1873, over 825,000
hides were transported by rail from the plains to the east.68 But the real devastation took place
during the 1870s and 80s as hunters, the military, and growing numbers of cattle ranchers moved
deeper into the plains, eliminating buffalo for their own varied purposes. The expansion of the
railroad and cattle ranching into the west occurred simultaneously as part of the industrialization
of American agriculture and was bolstered by the Homestead Act of 1862, which granted settlers
160 acres of land each. The destruction of the buffalo herds made more room for ranchers and
opened up a new market of beef buyers—the Native Americans who were starving as a result of
the depletion of the buffalo herds.69
Historian Daniel Smits argues that the military played a significant role in the extermination of
the bison.70 The army was integral to securing the frontier and pushing it westward, making room
for the railroads and accompanying ranchers and settlements. General William T. Sherman, for
example, held that getting rid of the buffalo was necessary for the development of the rail system,
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and frequently sponsored civilian hunting expeditions were one solution to the problem. Likewise,
in his memoirs, Lieutenant John M. Schofield, commander of the Department of Missouri from
1869-1870, wrote, “[w]ith my cavalry and carbined artillery camped in front, I wanted no other
occupation in life than to ward off the savage and kill off his food until there should no longer be
an Indian frontier in our beautiful country.”71 Slaughtering the buffalo had a two-fold benefit. It
cleared land for settlers and took care of the so-called “Indian problem.” An article in Navy Journal
from June 26, 1869 reported that Sherman stated “that the quickest way to compel the Indians to
settle down to civilized life was to send ten regiments of soldiers to the plains, with orders to shoot
buffaloes until they became too scarce to support the redskins.”72 For the army, the buffalo and
Native Americans were so inextricably linked that soldiers would occasionally pretend that when
they were killing buffalo they were actually killing Indians.73 The killing of buffalo was a symbolic
act that also had real life-threatening consequences for Indigenous peoples and their cultures.
The army worked in tandem with hunters as a method of eradicating Native Americans, often
sponsoring hunting expeditions and inviting hunters to accompany them.74 Killing the buffalo
provided the hunters with sport and profit. With the development of the railroads, amateur hunters
took excursions to the plains to shoot buffalo from the train windows as they passed herds.75 Their
impact on the herds was relatively benign compared to the market hunters, some of whom claimed
they could kill forty to fifty buffalo in a day.
[The hunters] often worked in pairs. They would hide in a foxhole and wait for a herd to
pass. Killing the herd leader was the most effective way to start. If you could kill the boss,
the herd would dissolve into grand confusion, because it would take some time for a new
leader to emerge. The next best plan was to kill an animal and wait until others in the herd
caught the scent of blood. With the aid of a needle gun and telescopic sight, it was easy to hit
one animal. After it had fallen, all those near enough to smell the blood would circle around
the fallen one, sniffing the air and pawing the ground. These stationary targets were easy to
pick off, one by one.76

According to Hubbard, the hunters were not simply taking advantage of the fear and chaos incited
within the buffalos but also preying on the complex social and inner lives of the buffalo. She states,
“[b]uffalo feel grief for their dead, according to both my traditional teachers and the longtime
buffalo warden at the Grasslands National Park, Wes Olson. He has observed [that]…rather than
abandon the body, buffalo will stay with the deceased, attempt to revive their family member,
and make audible sounds of grief.”77 Not only do buffalo feel grief for their dead, but the killing of
adults and kidnapping of young buffalo broke down the buffalo’s own social relations and led to
mental illness. Hubbard recounts the experiences of John Cook, a buffalo hunter:
[T]he hunters’ [had a] practice of surrounding available waterways, forcing the buffalo to
approach anyway, and gunning them down. Those buffalo who managed to find a water
source that was free from hunters ‘would rush and crowd in pell-mell, crowding, jamming,
and trampling down both the weak and the strong, to quench a burning thirst. Many of them
were rendered insane from their intolerable, unbearable thirst’ (Cook 1938: 198). Instead of
living cooperatively in their herd society, the buffalo were tortured prior to their death at the
hands of the hide hunters.78
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Hubbard contends that ignoring the personhood of the buffalo reinforces the anthropocentric bias
in genocide scholarship, which leads to a failure to account for the types of relationships between
humans and other-than-human beings that exist in many Indigenous cultures.79 The death of the
buffalo had a debilitating effect on the Indigenous communities who regarded them as kin, allies,
and protectors. According to environmental activist Winona LaDuke of the Anishinaabe, “[m]any
Native people view the historic buffalo slaughter as the time when the buffalo relatives, the older
brothers, stood up and took the killing intended for their younger brothers, the Native peoples.”80
Conclusion
If we accept the veracity of the principles that everything is related81 and that the universe is alive
and must be approached in a personal manner, then ecocide is not simply a method of genocide.
It is genocide. For the Native American scholars discussed above, relationships between humans
and other beings are frequently equal and nonhierarchical. Other beings have both personality and
power and, as such, must be treated with the same respect accorded to human persons. According
to Short, ecocide is genocide when it harms human groups. Destruction of nonhuman nature
is problematic because it destroys a resource upon which humans rely for their biological and
cultural survival. From a Native American perspective, however, nonhuman nature is not merely
a resource—its value does not lie solely in whether it can serve human purposes. Rather, no ethical
distinction exists between human groups and the other-than-human beings that are part of those
communities. Everything is related; everything is connected. This means that ecocide is personal.
For example, during the 2016-17 Standing Rock movement against the Dakota Access Pipeline,
Native American protestors held signs that stated, “Water is sacred” and “Water is life.” These
posters did more than signify the fear that a resource would be affected. These words signified
a concern about the wellbeing, health, and livelihood of the water and land for its own sake as
an integral member of the community. As Joyce Rain Anderson explains, thinking of the Native
Americans who came to Standing Rock to resist the pipeline project as protesters is inaccurate:
“[i]n most Native nations, the people see themselves as caretakers of Mother Earth, enacting that
inseparable link between land and body. In other words, we are relatives, and that relationship
calls for responsibility.”82 Ojibwa scholar Dennis H. McPherson and philosopher Douglas J. Rabb
echo this sentiment in their book Indian from the Inside: “[t]here is, we suggest, a moral obligation to
protect the habitat of the moose, the beaver, the muskrat, and the lynx; the habitat of geese, ducks,
grouse and hare, not just because members of the Band wish to continue hunting and trapping,
but because these other-than-human persons are also extended members of the Ojibwa society.”83
To adequately address the harms suffered by Native Americans and other Indigenous groups
as a result of ecocide, the definition of genocide needs to change so that it does not exhibit an
anthropocentric bias that limits potential victims of genocide to human groups. Further grounds for
such a change could also be established by reversing the claim that ecocide is genocide to genocide
is ecocide. Although digging deeply into this line of argumentation is beyond the scope of this
article, there is already research that demonstrates how humans are participants in ecosystems that
become disturbed when humans are removed from them or when the human groups occupying
those localities change.84 To briefly elaborate on this point, consider William Cronon’s research
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in his book Changes in the Land.85 He documents how the ecology of New England changed upon
the arrival of European colonists and the displacement of Native Americans from their lands. For
example, various tribes in the northeastern US practiced forest management techniques including
controlled burning. Such practices allowed certain trees, including birch, pitch pine, and white
pine, that grow well in direct sunlight to flourish while keeping underbrush at bay.86 Doing so
provided open pathways through the woods that allowed larger game animals like deer and lowlying plants like strawberries to proliferate. As Native peoples were displaced from their lands and
encouraged to adopt European lifestyles, these practices came to an end, which ultimately changed
which species were able to thrive and survive. Regardless of whether some species were seen as
desirable for extraction and consumption by the settlers, the simple change in how humans were
or were no longer interacting with the land would have led some species to experience dramatic
changes to their survivability and to suffer great losses of life, making the removal of Indigenous
people from the land a form of ecocide.
In contemporary times, Indigenous peoples have come into conflict with global conservation
movements, which care deeply about the health of ecosystems and animal populations but
frequently hold the view that such ecosystems flourish best when humans leave them alone. As
Mark Dowie illustrates in Conservation Refugees, some Native peoples have not only been forced
to discontinue traditional subsistence hunting practices but have even been displaced from their
lands so that the land and its other-than-human inhabitants can be protected.87 Certain attitudes
about conservation, made explicit in documents like the U.S. Wilderness Act of 1964, which states
that wilderness is “an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man,
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain,”88 demonstrate a strong human-nature
binary that appears to reject the notion that humans can have a non-destructive function within
an ecosystem. Views like this are used to justify forced relocations of Indigenous peoples, which
in turn interfere with the cultural traditions of those human groups; such interference ultimately
may be genocidal based on Lemkin’s definition. When these views lead to the displacement of
Indigenous groups, they also disrupt and destroy the relationships between humans, the land, and
the land’s other inhabitants such that those other creatures might face destruction or great losses to
their communities and changes to their habitats.
For the most part, Western cultures have largely accepted that humans are ontologically and
morally superior to other beings—that humans deserve moral treatment because of their inherent
dignity and rights. This view has been at the expense of other-than-human beings and does not
reflect the ontology of non-Western worldviews, such as the Indigenous philosophies described
above. Ideally, the definition of genocide should be rewritten to incorporate nonhuman groups
as groups that can be targeted through genocide. Until the definition of genocide is altered, the
definition will continue to reflect a colonial worldview that has been used to excuse the destruction
of nonhuman nature and oppress Native peoples. However, since ratification of such a change is
highly unlikely given the current state of the world and the entrenched views about human-animal
relations, at minimum, ecocide needs to be recognized as an act of genocide. This addition would
not only help capture some cultural components lost in the transition from Lemkin’s definition to
the UN’s but also mitigate some of the anthropocentric and Western biases of the UN definition and
provide Indigenous peoples and other groups with more leverage for contesting climate change
and other devastating acts against nonhuman nature.
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